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Explaining cross-national variations in the informalisation of employment: 
some lessons from Central and Eastern Europe  
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to better understand cross-national variations in the 
informalisation of employment by evaluating critically three contrasting explanations 
which variously represent informal employment as more prevalent in: poorer under-
developed economies (modernisation thesis); societies with high taxes, corruption and 
state interference in the free market (neo-liberal thesis) and societies with inadequate 
levels of state intervention to protect workers (political economy thesis). To evaluate 
these rival explanations, the relationship between the variable informalisation of 
employment in 10 Central and East European countries, measured using data from a 
2007 Eurobarometer cross-national survey involving 5,769 face-to-face interviews, and 
their broader work and welfare regimes are analysed. The finding is that wealthier, less 
corrupt and more equal societies and those possessing higher levels of taxation, social 
protection and effective redistribution via social transfers are significantly more likely 
to have lower levels of informalisation. No evidence is thus found to support the neo-
liberal tenets that the informalisation of employment results from high taxes and too 
much state interference in the free market but evidence is found to positively confirm 
the modernisation and political economy theses as explanations for the cross-national 
variations in the informalisation of employment. The paper concludes by discussing the 
tentative theoretical and policy implications of these findings and calling for further 
evaluation of their wider validity both longitudinally and across other global regions. 
Keywords: informal sector; shadow economy; undeclared work; corruption; tax 
evasion; Central and Eastern Europe.  
Introduction 
Given that 60 per cent of all jobs globally are in the informal economy (Jütting and Laiglesia 
2009) and informal employment is expanding relative to formal employment in many global 
regions (ILO 2011; OECD 2012; Schneider 2008, 2011; Williams, 2014), it is important to 
understand and explain the informalisation of employment and how this varies across 
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populations. The aim of this paper is to begin to do so by seeking to explain the cross-
national variations in the informalisation of employment in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE).  
Until now, three contrasting explanations have been proposed for the cross-national 
variations in the informalisation of employment relations. During the twentieth century, 
informal employment was widely explained simply as a leftover from some pre-modern 
system of work organisation that was steadily disappearing as economies modernised and a 
formalisation of work occurred (Boeke 1942; Geertz 1963; Lewis 1959). Although scholars 
warned that this was not necessarily the case during the 1980s (Gershuny 1983; Handy 1984; 
Shankland and Turner 1988; Sparrow 1986), since the turn of the millennium the 
informalisation of employment has been more widely recognised resulting in the emergence 
of various contrasting explanations. On the one hand, a µQHR-OLEHUDO¶WKHVLVhas proposed that 
its incidence directly results from high taxes, corruption and state interference in the free 
market and that the remedy is therefore to pursue tax reductions, deregulation and to 
minimize state interference in both the market and welfare provision (Becker 2004; De Soto 
1989, 2001; London and Hart 2004; Nwabuzor 2005; Sauvy 1984; Small Business Council 
2004). On the other hand, a political economy perspective has argued that its resurgence is a 
direct by-product of a deregulated global production system that uses informal employment 
as a key component in its new downsizing, sub-contracting and outsourcing arrangements 
and that the solution is therefore to pursue greater state intervention in both work and welfare 
arrangements so as to stem the growth of the informal economy (Davis 2006; Gallin 2001; 
Slavnic 2010).  To evaluate these competing explanations for the cross-national variations in 
the informalisation of employment, the intention here is to compare the variable prevalence 
of this work practice across CEE countries.  
To achieve this, the first section of this paper will briefly review the competing 
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modernisation, political economy and neo-liberal theses that have been previously used to 
explain the variable prevalence of informal employment across countries. To evaluate 
critically these rival explanations, the second section will then report evidence from a 2007 
Eurobarometer survey on the cross-national variations in the informalisation of employment 
in CEE countries and how this varies across different work and welfare regimes. Revealing 
significant correlations between lower levels of informalisation and particular types of work 
and welfare arrangement, the concluding section will then discuss the implications of the 
findings both for theory and policy. 
At the outset, however, it is important to define informal employment. Although some 
45 different adjectives have been used to describe this realm, including µDW\SLFDO¶µFDVK-in-
KDQG¶, µKLGGHQ¶µQRQ-YLVLEOH¶µLUUHJXODU¶µVKDGRZ¶µXQUHJXODWHG¶µXQGHUJURXQG¶and 
µXQGHFODUHG¶, all describe what is absent, insufficient or missing relative to formal 
employment. Reviewing the extensive literature, a strong consensus prevails regarding what 
is missing, absent or insufficient. Informal employment is widely defined as remunerated 
activity that is not declared to the state for tax, social security and labour law purposes as 
should be the case, but is legal in all other respects (European Commission 1998, 2007; 
OECD 2012; Pfau-Effinger 2009; Sepulveda and Syrett 2007; Williams 2006). In 
consequence, if an employment relationship possesses other absences or insufficiencies, such 
as that the goods and services provided are illegal or that the work is unpaid, these work 
practices are not defined as informal employment but instead as belonging to the µFULPLQDO¶RU
µunpaid¶ spheres respectively. Blurred edges, nevertheless, remain such as when gifts are 
provided in lieu of money or in-kind labour is exchanged (White 2009; Williams 2006). In 
this paper, however, informal employment includes only exchanges involving monetary 
transactions between the employer/purchaser and employee/supplier. 
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This definition of informal employment covers diverse forms of employment 
relationship. On the one hand, it includes wholly undeclared employment, in the form of 
either waged work or self-employment, where the worker is not formally employed by the 
employer and the remunerated activity is not declared to the state for tax, social security and 
labour law purposes. On the other hand, and sometimes overlooked because it challenges the 
widely held notion that jobs are either formal or informal but cannot be concurrently both 
(Williams 2009), this definition also includes the employment relationship where a formal 
employee receives from their formal employer both a declared salary as well as an additional 
XQGHFODUHGµHQYHORSH¶ZDJHNeef 2002; Sedlenieks 2003; Williams 2010; Woolfson 2007).    
Explaining cross-national variations in the informalisation of employment  
To explain the variations in the informalisation of employment, three contrasting 
explanations have been proposed: the modernisation, neo-liberal and political theses.  Each is 
here considered in turn.   
Modernisation thesis 
For much of the twentieth century, it was widely believed that the formal economy was 
steadily colonising every nook and cranny of the modern world and that the informal 
economy was merely a residue or remnant from some pre-modern era that was gradually 
fading from view as the modern formal sector took hold. The persistence of informal 
employment was consequently viewed as DVLJQRIµWUDGLWLRQDOLVP¶µXQGHU-GHYHORSPHQW¶DQG
µEDFNZDUGQHVV¶whilst the emerging modern formal economy was in contrast delineated as 
representing µSURJUHVV¶µDGYDQFHPHQW¶DQGµGHYHORSPHQW¶*HHUW]*LOEHUW/HZLV
1959). Viewed through this lens, informal employment thus constitutes a pre-modern 
traditional economic order that persists at the fringes of modern society and is fading from 
view with modernisation. Applying this to explaining the cross-national variations in the 
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prevalence of informal employment, it can be suggested that in less developed economies, 
measured in terms of GDP per capita, such employment will be higher. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Modernisation hypothesis (H1): the informalisation of employment will be higher in 
less developed economies measured in terms of their GDP per capita. 
 
 
Neo-liberal thesis 
For many commentators of a neo-liberal persuasion, the prevalence of informal employment 
is deemed a populist reaction to high taxes, a corrupt state system and too much interference 
in the free market, which leads to a rational economic decision to voluntarily exit the formal 
economy in order to avoid the costs, time and effort of formal registration (e.g., Becker 2004; 
De Soto 1989 2001; London and Hart 2004; Nwabuzor 2005; Sauvy 1984; Small Business 
Council 2004). From this neo-liberal perspective, therefore, informal workers are only 
breaking rules and regulations imposed by an excessively intrusive state and are seen as a 
political movement resisting state over-regulation so as to generate a rational competitive 
market economy. Here, in consequence, the prevalence of informal employment will be 
greater in economies with higher taxes and public sector corruption and greater state 
interference and the resultant solution is to reduce taxes, tackle public sector corruption, 
deregulation and minimal state intervention. To explore the validity of this neo-liberal theory, 
therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Neo-liberal hypothesis (H2): the informalisation of employment will be higher in 
countries with higher tax rates, greater public sector corruption and higher levels of 
state interference in the free market. 
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Political economy thesis 
In stark contrast to neo-liberals, political economists view the informalisation of employment 
to result from too little rather than too much state intervention in work and welfare 
arrangements. Informal employment is construed as an inherent component of the current 
production practices of late capitalism and a key facet of the new downsizing, sub-contracting 
and outsourcing arrangements emerging under deregulated global capitalism since 
informalisation provides businesses with a production channel to attain flexible production, 
profit and cost reduction (Castells and Portes 1989; Davis 2006; Gallin 2001; Hudson 2005; 
Sassen 1996; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo, 2013).  In deregulated global capitalism, therefore, the 
full-employment/comprehensive formal welfare state regime that characterised the Fordist 
and socialist period is being replaced by a new post-Fordist and post-socialist regime of 
deregulation, liberalization and privatization (Castells and Portes 1989; Meagher 2010; 
Sassen 1996) which through subcontracting, outsourcing and  diminishing state involvement 
in welfare and employment has enabled informal economic arrangements to move to the 
heart of contemporary economies.  
Informal employment is thus viewed as unregulated, low paid and insecure work 
FRQGXFWHGXQGHUµVZHDWVKRS-OLNH¶FRQGLWLRQVE\PDUJLQDOLVHGSRSXODWLRQVwho undertake 
such work due to their exclusion from the formal economy and no other options being open 
to them (Ahmad 2008; Castells and Portes 1989; Davis 2006; Gallin 2001; Hudson 2005; 
Sassen 1996). As such, informal employment is a result of the under-regulation of work and 
welfare provision, including reduced social protection and social transfers, and the remedy is 
greater intervention in work and welfare arrangements (Davis 2006; Gallin, 2001; Slavnic 
2010). Consequently, informalisation will be greater in countries with lower levels of state 
intervention to protect workers from poverty. To evaluate this, the following hypothesis can 
be tested: 
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Political economy hypothesis (H3): the informalisation of employment will be higher in 
countries with lower tax rates and less social protection to protect workers from 
poverty. 
Previous evaluations of the rival explanations 
Conventionally, most scholars have explained the greater prevalence of informal employment 
in some populations rather than others by adopting one or other of these theses. For example, 
Yamada (1996) adopts the neo-liberal thesis whilst Slavnic (2010) adopts the political 
economy thesis.  
Recently however, when examining the informalisation of employment at a national 
or local level, or amongst particular population groups, a more nuanced understanding has 
begun to emerge that combines these theories. For example, it has been contested that the 
political economy thesis is more relevant to explaining informal employment in relatively 
deprived population groups and neo-liberal theory to relatively affluent population groups 
(Evans et al. 2006; Williams and Round 2010; Williams et al. 2012), that neo-liberal exit 
rationales are more common in developed economies and political economy exclusion 
rationales in developing economies (Oviedo et al. 2009) and that women are driven more by 
political economy exclusion motives and men more by neo-liberal voluntary exit motives 
(Franck 2012; Grant 2013; Williams 2011).  
Few if any studies, however, have yet evaluated critically the validity of these 
competing theses when explaining cross-national variations in the informalisation of 
employment. To begin filling this gap therefore, we here conduct an exploratory analysis of 
the validity of these theories when explaining the cross-national variations in the 
informalisation of employment in Central and Eastern Europe. The reason for selecting this 
European region is because over the past few decades, adherents to neo-liberal theory, or 
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ZKDW.RVWHUDFDOOVµPDUNHWPLVVLRQDULHV¶LQFOXGLQJWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG
and World Bank, have imposed through structural adjustment programmes, neo-liberal 
remedies on this region. This paper therefore, evaluates critically the validity of such an 
approach for tackling the informalisation of employment in Central and Eastern Europe.    
Cross-national variations in informal employment in Central and Eastern Europe  
Methodology 
Data 
Most previous studies of informal employment in CEE nations are small-scale surveys of 
particular nations, population groups and/or types of informality (e.g., Centre for the Study of 
Democracy 2008; Ghinararu 2007; Loukanova and Bezlov 2007; Williams et al., 2013). 
These however, cannot be aggregated together to analyse the varying prevalence of informal 
employment cross-nationally because they are not representative surveys and use varying 
definitions and measurement methods so the findings are not comparable. 
Cross-national comparative measures of the prevalence of informal employment in 
CEE are of two kinds: indirect measures of its prevalence that use proxy indicators and/or 
statistical traces of such work found in data collected for other purposes (GHK and 
Fondazione Brodolini 2009; Ram and Williams 2008), and surveys that directly interview 
people about their participation in informal employment (European Commission 2007). Here, 
the latter is employed. Although advocates of indirect methods sometimes assert that 
interview methods underestimate the extent of informal employment because participants 
conceal their informal work, those who have conducted such surveys find that although 
participants hide this work from the authorities, they do not hide it from researchers and 
openly discuss this matter with them (MacDonald 1994; Pahl 1984). 
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In 2005, recognising the lack of cross-national comparative data on the 
informalisation of employment relations, the European Commission funded the design of a 
survey7KLVSDSHU¶VDXWKRUZDVSDUWRIWKHWHDPHPSOR\HGWRGHVLJQWKHsurvey. The resultant 
survey was then implemented as Special Eurobarometer No. 284, conducted as part of wave 
67.3 of the 2007 Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2007). Here, the findings of 
this survey in ten CEE countries are reported, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania. In total, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with 5,769 participants in these 10 countries ranging from some 
500 interviews in smaller nations to 1,500+ interviews in larger countries conducted in a 
manner that provides a representative sample of the population in each country. In each 
country, the standard multi-stage random (probability) sampling method was used as in other 
Eurobarometer surveys (see European Commission 2007).  
Methods 
To gather evidence, a face-to-face structured interview schedule was used which adopted a 
gradual approach to the more sensitive research questions. Participants were firstly asked for 
their opinions and attitudes regarding informal employment and having established some 
rapport, questions were asked regarding their purchase of goods and services on an 
undeclared basis in the last 12 months, whether they received envelope wage payments, and 
finally, about their participation in wholly undeclared work.  
Given how advocates of indirect methods often argue that participants hide their 
informal work from interviewers, it is here useful to briefly mention the validity of this 
survey method. The finding is that in 88 per cent of the interviews conducted, the 
interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation from the participant. Cooperation was 
asserted to be bad in only 2 per cent of cases.   
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Measures 
To measure the prevalence of informal employment in these CEE countries, firstly, the 
number of the full sample of 5,769 participants who had undertaken wholly undeclared 
employment in the last 12 months was surveyed and secondly, the 2,355 participants who 
were in formal employment were asked about whether they had received envelope wages 
from their formal employer in the last 12 months. Here, those who had participated in wholly 
undeclared work in the form of one-off jobs conducted for kin, friends, neighbours and 
acquaintances for reasons related to redistributing money or help to somebody in need are 
H[FOXGHGIURPWKHDQDO\VLVVLQFHVXFKµSDLGIDYRXUV¶DUHPRUHDNLQWRXQSDLGFRPPXQLW\
exchange than formal employment in terms of the social relations and motives involved. 
However, all other forms of wholly undeclared employment are included from permanent 
full-time informal jobs conducted either as an employee or on a self-employed basis, through 
to all part-time, temporary or short-term work regardless of its duration, just as is the case 
when analysing the findings regarding participation in formal employment. The outcome of 
identifying the number of participants in formal employment, the number of these who were 
paid envelope wages and the number holding wholly undeclared jobs, was that the proportion 
of all jobs that are informal was calculated. 
 To identify participants conducting undeclared work and receiving envelope wages, 
H[SOLFLWGHILQLWLRQVZHUHXVHG8QGHFODUHGZRUNZDVGHVFULEHGDVµDctivities which were not 
or not fully reported to the tax or social security authorities and where the person who 
acquired the good or service was aware of this¶ZKLOVWHQYHORSHZDJHVZHUHGHVFULEHGDV
EHLQJZKHQµemployers prefer to pay all or part of the regular salary or the remuneration for 
extra work or overtime hours cash-in-hand and without declaring it to tax or social security 
authorities¶(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ. Although this reduces the likelihood of 
participants reporting other economic practices such as criminal activities, it is worth noting 
11 
 
that blurred edges remain and there will be variation both across individuals and countries in 
whether an activity and what activity is reported as informal, not least due to national 
variations in legislation regarding what is informal and what is not (see, for example, Portet 
2005).     
To generate statistical indicators and data on the characteristics each theorisation 
suggests has an influence on the prevalence of informal employment, official data sources of 
the European Commission have been used and data collated for 2007, the same year as the 
Eurobarometer survey of informal employment (European Commission 2011, Eurostat 2007, 
2010, 2013a,b,c). The only indicator and data taken from a non-official source is on 
pHUFHSWLRQVRISXEOLFVHFWRUFRUUXSWLRQH[WUDFWHGIURP7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶V
corruption perceptions index for 2007 (Transparency International 2013).  
To evaluate the modernisation thesis, three indicators are employed that have 
previously been used (ILO 2012; Yamada 1996), namely: 
x GDP per capita (European Commission 2011, Table 3). and  
x purchasing power standards (PPS) (Eurostat, 2013a) 
x Human Development Index (HDI) - this is a composite of life expectancy, education, and 
income indices intended to shift the focus of development from national income 
accounting to people-centred policies (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). 
To evaluate the neo-liberal thesis that the prevalence of informal employment is a result of 
high taxes, corruption and state interference in the free market, meanwhile, indicators are 
analysed previously used by Eurofound (2013) and the European Commission (2013) when 
evaluating the assumptions of neo-liberal thought: 
x the implicit tax rates (ITR) on labour, which is a summary measure of the average 
effective tax burden on the income of employed labour. This is the sum of all direct and 
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LQGLUHFWWD[HVDQGHPSOR\HHV¶DQGHPSOR\HUV¶VRFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQVOHYLHGRQHPSOR\HG
labour income divided by the total compensation of employees (Eurostat 2010); 
x total tax revenue (excluding social contributions) as a percentage of GDP. Total tax 
revenue here includes: all taxes on production and imports (e.g., taxes enterprises incur 
such as for professional licenses, taxes on land and building and payroll taxes), all current 
taxes on income and wealth (including both direct and indirect taxes) and all capital taxes 
(Eurostat, 2007), and  
x 7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶V2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is used 
(Transparency International 2013). This is a composite index of perceptions of public 
sector corruption that draws on 14 expert opinion surveys and scores nations on a 0-10 
scale, with zero indicating high levels and 10 low levels of perceived public sector 
corruption. 
To analyse both the neo-liberal thesis that state interference leads to greater levels of informal 
employment, as well as the political economy thesis that informalisation is a direct by-
product of a deregulatory regime and inadequate levels of state intervention, five indicators 
are analysed previously used by the European Commission (2013) and Eurofound (2013) 
when evaluating the assumptions of neo-liberal and political economy thought:  
x levels of state social protection expenditure (excluding old age benefits) as a proportion 
of GDP;  
x the percentage of the total population at risk of poverty, defined here as persons with an 
equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 per 
cent of the national median equivalised disposable income, after social transfers (Eurostat 
2013b); 
x the effectiveness of state redistribution via social transfers. Here, the poverty level is 
again defined as the proportion of the population with an income below 60 percent of the 
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national median income, and then the reduction in percentage points of poverty after 
social transfers is calculated to determine the effectiveness of state redistribution 
(European Commission 2011, Table 3);  
x the inequalities in the distribution of income (Eurostat 2013c), measured by evaluating 
the ratio of total income (by which is meant equivalised disposable income) received by 
the 20 per cent of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by 
the 20 per cent of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile), and  
x the level of equality in a society, as measured by the gini-coefficient (European 
Commission 2011). 
Analysis  
To analyse the relationship between the informalisation of employment and the various 
characteristics of work and welfare regimes which these competing theorisations deem 
influential, and given the small sample size of just 10 countries and lack of necessary controls 
to include in a multivariate regression analysis, it is only possible here to conduct bivariate 
regression analyses of the relationship between the informalisation of employment and 
different individual characteristics of the wider regulatory environment. To do this, 
6SHDUPDQ¶VUDQNFRUUHODWLRQcoefficient (rs) is used due to the non-parametric nature of the 
data. Nevertheless, and as will be shown, despite being limited to bivariate regression 
analysis, some meaningful findings are produced regarding the validity of the different 
theoretical perspectives.  
Findings  
Across the ten CEE countries surveyed, 20.1 per cent of all reported employment conducted 
during the 12 months prior to the survey was informal employment in that some or all of the 
remunerated activity was not declared to the state for tax, social security and labour law 
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purposes when it should have been, but the activity is legal in all other respects (see Figure 
1). There are, however, variations in the prevalence of informal employment across this 
region ranging from the Czech Republic and Slovenia (where 7 per cent and 8.2 per cent of 
employment is informal respectively) to Romania where 35.7 per cent of all reported 
employment is informal employment.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
How, therefore, can these cross-national variations in the informalisation of employment be 
explained? )LUVWO\DQGWRHYDOXDWHWKHPRGHUQLVDWLRQWKHVLVWKDWµdeveloped¶ wealthier 
economies have lower levels of informalisDWLRQDQGµless developed¶HFRQRPLHs higher levels 
of informalisation, the relationship between the prevalence of informal employment and the 
level of development across these CEE countries in 2007 is analysed (see Table A1). A 
strong significant relationship is identified between the extent of informal employment and 
the levels of GDP per capita at the 0.01 level (rs=-.879**). Countries with higher levels of 
GDP per capita have more formalised employment relations systems. This is similarly the 
case when purchasing power standards (PPS) is investigated, which unlike GDP per capita, 
takes into account the differences in the cost of living between countries. Again, there is a 
strong correlation between the prevalence of informal employment and the level of PPS at the 
0.01 level (rs=-.915**). 7KLVLVDOVRWKHFDVHZKHQDZLGHUGHILQLWLRQRIµGHYHORSPHQW¶LV
taken in the form of the Human Development Index (HDI). A strong correlation is identified 
between the prevalence of informal employment and the HDI (rs=-.867**).  Informalisation is 
lower in more developed countries. Indeed, previous studies reveal that this relationship 
remains valid when extrapolated beyond these CEE countries (ILO, 2012; Yamada, 1996). 
Akin to this study however, the directionality of the correlation in terms of a cause-effect 
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relationship cannot be established. This, therefore, is a limitation of both the current and 
previous studies.   
Turning to the neo-liberal thesis, the correlation between the prevalence of informal 
employment and high taxes, corruption and state interference needs to be analysed. 
Examining the tax rates tenet, the first finding is that there is a strong statistically significant 
correlation between the implicit tax rate (ITR) on labour and the prevalence of informal 
employment across countries (rs= -.855**), but not in the direction assumed by neo-liberal 
theory. Instead, the higher is the average effective tax burden on employed labour, the less 
prevalent is informal employment. Moreover, taking another measure of tax rates, namely 
total tax revenue (excluding social contributions) as a percentage of GDP, no relationship is 
identified with informal employment (rs= .091). Contrary to neo-liberal discourse therefore, 
no evidence is found that the prevalence of informal employment is greater in nations with 
higher tax rates. 
Turning to the neo-liberal assertion that informal employment is more prevalent 
where there is greater public sector corruption since this leads citizens to exit the formal 
economy in order to pursue means of livelihood beyond the reach of a corrupt public sector, a 
strong correlation is found between the level of public sector corruption and the degree of 
informalisation (rs= -.815**); the higher is the perceived level of public sector corruption, the 
greater is the prevalence of informal employment.  
Is it also the case, therefore, that higher levels of state interference in the free market 
leads to higher levels of informalisation, as neo-liberals suggest? Or is it the case, as political 
economists assert, that the prevalence of informal employment reduces with greater 
intervention in work and welfare regimes? 
Examining the correlation between the prevalence of informal employment and the 
levels of state social protection expenditure (excluding old age benefits) as a proportion of 
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GDP, a strong statistically significant correlation is identified; the greater the level of social 
protection expenditure, the lower is the level of informalisation (rs=-.790**). This therefore 
supports the political economy rather than neo-liberal explanation. In regulatory 
environments in which there is greater social protection of citizens, informal employment is 
less prevalent.  
Is there also a relationship between state intervention to reduce the proportion of the 
population at risk of poverty, using social transfers, and the prevalence of informal 
employment? Examining the relationship between the prevalence of informal employment 
cross-nationally and the percentage of the total population at risk of poverty, a strong 
correlation is identified (rs=.915**). The higher the proportion of the population at risk of 
poverty, the higher is the prevalence of informal employment. 
However, is the level of informal employment lower in countries in which there is 
greater state intervention to reduce the proportion of the population at risk of poverty using 
social transfers? The finding is a strong statistically significant correlation: the more effective 
is state redistribution via social transfers in reducing poverty, the lower is the prevalence of 
informal employment (rs=-0.782**). This further supports the political economy explanation 
that greater state intervention reduces the prevalence of informal employment.  
Indeed, analysing the inequalities in the distribution of income (Eurostat 2013c), a 
strong correlation is identified with the prevalence of informal employment (rs=.906**). The 
more equal is the society in terms of the distribution of income, the lower is the prevalence of 
informal employment. This is reinforced when the correlation between the gini-coefficient 
(European Commission 2011) is analysed. There is a strong correlation; the more equal the 
society the lower is the prevalence of informal employment (rs= .766**).  
In sum, these bivariate regression analyses reveal that in wealthier and more equal 
CEE societies, CEE countries with less public sector corruption, with higher levels of 
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taxation, social protection and more effective redistribution via social transfers, are 
significantly correlated with a lower prevalence of informal employment. Indeed, this 
perhaps explains the higher prevalence of informal employment in Romania, Latvia and 
Bulgaria which are generally less wealthy and less equal societies with higher rates of public 
sector corruption and lower levels of taxation, social protection and state redistribution via 
social transfers compared with countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia.  
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has sought to better understand the cross-national variations in the informalisation 
of employment by evaluating critically three FRPSHWLQJH[SODQDWLRQVWKHµPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶
thesis which simply purports that the informal economy decreases as economies develop; the 
µQHR-OLEHUDO¶thesis that informalisation is a direct result of high taxes, corruption and state 
interference in the free market DQGWKHµpolitical economy¶WKHVLVWKDWLQIRUPDOLVDWLRQLVWKH
outcome of deregulation that results in inadequate levels of state intervention to protect 
citizens. Examining their validity when explaining cross-national variations in the prevalence 
of informal employment in Central and Eastern Europe, the finding is that wealthier nations, 
less corrupt states and more equal societies, and those possessing higher levels of taxation, 
social protection and effective redistribution via social transfers, have lower levels of 
informalisation. This, as will now be discussed, has both theoretical and policy implications. 
In theoretical terms, the neo-liberal thesis (H2) is negatively confirmed. 
Informalisation is not a product of high taxes and too much state interference. Instead, quite 
the opposite is found. Positively confirming the political economy thesis (H3), the prevalence 
of informal employment appears to be a direct by-product of under-regulation and it is in 
nations where there are higher levels of taxation, social protection and effective redistribution 
via social transfers that the prevalence of informal employment is lower. However, and as the 
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modernisation thesis (H1) asserts, wealthier economies measured in terms of GDP per capita 
and more developed  economies measured using the Human Development Index, have lower 
levels of informalisation, as do nations in which perceptions are that public sector corruption 
is lower, as the neo-liberal thesis intimates. The tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the 
tenets of the political economy thesis are valid but there is a need to incorporate the mainly 
neo-liberal notion regarding public sector corruption and the modernisation thesis that 
wealthier more developed societies have lower levels of informalisation. If these facets are 
integrated into the political economy perspective, it becomes apparent that the prevalence of 
informal employment is closely tied to the extent to which economies have undergone a 
modernisation of work and welfare arrangements along the lines of the European social 
model (European Commission 2011). In other words, wealthier more equal societies, those 
with less public sector corruption and those pursuing higher tax rates, greater levels of social 
protection and more effective redistribution via social transfers, have lower levels of informal 
employment. What is now required is to evaluate whether this holds both when a wider range 
of nations and other global regions are evaluated as well as when time-series data is analysed 
for individual countries.  
These findings have clear practical policy implications. Over the past two decades, the 
policy debate has involved evaluating whether targeted repressive measures and/or targeted 
incentives are the most effective means for moving employment into the formal economy 
(Dibben and Williams 2012; Eurofound 2013; Feld and Larsen 2012; OECD 2012; Williams 
and Lansky 2013; Williams and Nadin 2012; Williams et al. 2012). This paper, in stark 
contrast, strongly intimates that broader economic and social policy measures are important. 
The pursuit of lower taxes and deregulation, as advocated by neo-liberals, is not associated 
with reductions in informal employment. Instead, reducing informality is found to be 
associated with reducing public sector corruption, higher taxation, higher expenditure on 
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social protection, effective redistribution via social transfers and more equal societies. As 
such, it shows that broader policies associated with the wider modernisation of work and 
welfare arrangements are important.  
Again, whether the same finding emerges regarding the changes required when a 
wider range of countries and global regions are investigated, as well as whether it remains 
valid when time-series data is investigated for individual countries, requires further research. 
If a wider range of nations are analysed using for instance the International Labour 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶VGDWDEDVH,/2012), then multivariate regression analysis could also be used 
to correlate how important each characteristic is to the final outcome whilst controlling for 
other characteristics. This would overcome a major limitation of the current paper based on 
an analysis of just 10 nations. It would also help overcome the problems of reverse causality 
that apply to the correlations identified in this paper and also the fact that there may be third 
confounding variables influencing the correlations identified. Such further research is thus 
required to exclude these issues of confounders and reverse causality. 
In sum, this paper has revealed the strong correlation between reducing the prevalence 
of informal employment and the modernisation of work and welfare arrangements. What is 
now required is for this to be applied longitudinally within countries as well as to a broader 
range of countries and global regions, using more refined multivariate regression analysis, so 
as to evaluate whether the relationships hold as well as which characteristics are most 
significantly correlated with lower levels of informalisation. If this paper stimulates such 
further research and also recognition and investigation of the broader policy changes required 
in work and welfare arrangements to reduce informal employment, then it will have achieved 
its objective.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 Informalisation of employment and broader measures of economic and social development: by country  
 
Country % of 
employment 
that is 
informal 
GDP 
per 
capita 
GDP 
per 
capita 
in 
PPS 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Implicit 
tax rate 
on 
labour 
Total tax 
revenue (exc. 
Social 
contributions), 
as % of GDP 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
Social 
protection 
benefits 
(exc. Old 
age), % of 
GDP 
% of 
popn at 
risk of 
poverty 
Impact of 
state 
redistribution 
via social 
transfers 
Income 
distribution 
inequality 
Gini- 
coefficient 
Czech 
Republic 
7.0 13100 80 0.856 39.2 19.9 5.2 10.6 15.8 52.0 3.5 25.1 
Slovenia 8.2 17300 88 0.871 35.9 23.3 6.6 12.9 22.3 48.6 3.3 22.7 
Slovakia 13.0 11600 68 0.824 33.1 17.2 4.9 9.7 21.3 35.7 3.5 24.8 
Estonia 17.2 10300 69 0.832 33.7 20.4 6.5 8.6 22.0 23.9 5.5 31.4 
Hungary 17.3 9300 62 0.814 42.1 26.6 5.3 13.5 29.4 57.1 3.7 24.7 
Lithuania 18.2 7900 59 0.827 32.7 21.3 4.8 9.3 28.7 39.9 5.9 35.5 
Poland 18.7 8100 54 0.817 32.6 23.0 4.2 9.3 34.4 27.5 5.3 31.4 
Bulgaria 23.8 4600 40 0.766 27.4 25.2 4.1 8.2 60.7 17.4 7.0 33.4 
Latvia 29.6 8200 56 0.813 28.5 20.7 4.8 7.0 36.0 15.2 6.3 37.4 
Romania 35.7 5500 42 0.781 27.3 18.7 3.7 7.6 45.9 23.0 7.8 34.9 
 
